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TORT LAW-MuNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR POLICE HANDLING OF IN
TOXICATED DRIVERs-Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147,
444 A.2d 1380 (1982).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Approximately 25,000 people are killed annually in motor vehi
cle accidents involving drunk. drivers. I In 1980, approximately
650,000 people were injured in alcohol related automobile acci
dents.2 People usually drive drunk. as a result of an error in judg
ment, believing they are not intoxicated, or as a result of situational
factors such as an inability to secure a ride home. 3 Most drunk driv
ers, however, are not stopped by police. A recent study indicates
that one out of every ten drivers on the road on Friday and Saturday
nights are legally drunk.. 4 The chances of a drunk. driver being
stopped by the police are estimated to be between I and 500 and I
and 2,000. 5 On a nationwide average, police arrest fewer than five
drunk. drivers per officer per year. 6
Sherry Shore was a victim of a drunk driver who was stopped
by police, but who was not arrested or removed from the road. In
Shore v. Town of Stonington,7 the Connecticut Supreme Court re
fused to impose liability on the municipality holding that the duty to
enforce the drunk. driving and reckless driving statutes was a duty
owed to the public in general and not to anyone particular
individual.
This note will discuss the questionable legitimacy of the "public
1. Federal Legislation to Combat Drunk Driving Including National Driver Register:
Hearings on S. 2158 Before the Subcomm. on Suiface Trans. ofthe Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Trans. ,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1982) (statement of Diane K. Steed, Deputy
Administrator, National High Safety Administration) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
2. Id. Drunk driving statistics may actually be under estimated. AMERICAN MED

ICAL ASSOCIATION, ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER, A MANUAL ON THE
MEDICOLEGAL ASPECT OF CHEMICAL TESTS FOR INTOXICATION (2) (1968) [hereinafter
cited as ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER].
3. ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER, suJha note 2, at 7.
4. Hearings, supra note 1, at 66.

5.

Id.

6. Id. Police are reluctant to arrest drunk drivers because: I) procedures are cum
bersome and time consuming; 2) arrest of drunk drivers has not been a high priority;
3) courts may be unable to handle the case load. Id.
7. 187 Conn. 147, 149-50,444 A.2d 1379, 1380 (1982).
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duty" rule in the context of police handling of intoxicated drivers.
This rule will be examined in light of prior case law, ordinary negli
gence principles, policy considerations, stricter drunk driving laws,
and the increasing societal concern with the drunk driving problem. 8
II.

THE CASE

Lieutenant Edward Sylvia, a police officer employed by the
Town of Stonington, observed an automobile being operated erati
cally and at a high rate of speed. 9 Sylvia made a brief investigation,
gave the driver, Mark Cugini, a warning and subsequently left with
out conducting any alcohol related tests. 10 A short time later, Cugini
struck a vehicle operated by Sherry Shore, who later died as a result
of the injuries she received in the accident. I I
An action was brought against the Town of Stonington pursu
ant to Connecticut General Statutes, Section 7-465,12 which deals
with the assumption of liability for damage caused by municipal em
ployees. The plaintiffs claim was based on the alleged negligence l3
8. The scope of this note is limited to an analysis of the public duty rule of munici
pal liability regarding drunk drivers.
9. Shore, 187 Conn. at 150,444 A.2d at 1381.
10. Id. When Officer Sylvia stopped Cugini, he approached him and asked where
he was going in such a hurry. Cugini replied that he was there to pick up his girlfriend.
Sylvia warned Cugini that if he wanted to keep his license he had better slow down and
that he should let his girlfriend drive. Cugini entered the V.F.W. and Sylvia resumed
patrol. Id.
11. Id. at 151,444 A.2d at 1381.
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-465 (1983) reads in part:
(a) Any town, city or borough, notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of
law, general, special or local, shall pay on behalf of any employee of such mu
nicipality . . . , all sums which such employee becomes obligated to pay by
reason of liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded
for infringement of any person's civil right or for physical damages to person or
property, except as hereinafter set forth, if the employee, at the time of the
occurrence, accident, physical injury or damages complained of, was acting in
the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, and if
such occurrence, accident, physical injury or damage was not the result of any
wilful or wanton act of such employee in the discharge of such duty . . . . Such
municipality may arrange for and maintain appropriate insurance or may elect
to act as a self-insurer to maintain such protection. . . . Governmental immu
nity shall not be a defense in any action brought under this section.
13. Specifically the plaintiff claimed Sylvia was negligent in one or more of the
following respects: I) failing to issue a summons to Cugini for reckless driving in viola
tion of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-222 (1981); 2) failing to issue a summons to Cugini for
operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 14-227a (1981); 3) failing to arrest Cugini and take him into custody for violation
of any of the previously cited sections of the Connecticut General Statutes; 4) failing to
conduct or attempt to conduct any sobriety tests on Cugini; 5) permitting Cugini to go
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of the town's employee in failing to enforce the Connecticut statutes
against operating a vehicle while "under the influence"14 and reck
less driving. IS The trial court, viewing the facts in a light most
about his business, including the operation of a motor vehicle when he knew or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known that Cugini was under the influence of
alcohol and unfit to operate a motor vehicle in a responsible manner; 6) observing Cugini
enter an establishment known to him to serve intoxicating beverages when he knew, or in
exercise of reasonable care should have known that Cugini would consume additional
alcoholic beverages therein, thereby rendering him even more unfit to operate a motor
vehicle; 7) failing to verify the allegation of Cugini that someone else was available in the
V.F.W. Post to provide him with a ride in his motor vehicle; 8) failing to observe Cugini
either inside the V.F.W. Post, or after exiting to determine whether or not he was capable
of operating a motor vehicle; 9) failing to fulfill his responsibilities as a police officer to
enforce the motor vehicle laws of the State of Connecticut. Plaintiff's Appeal from Supe
rior Court at 2-4, Shore.
14. The statute in existence at the time was CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227a (1981)
(amended 1982) re~d in part:
(a) No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this state
or upon any road or of a district organized under the provisions of chapter 105,
. . . or upon any private road on which a speed limit has been established in
accordance with the provisions of section 14-218a, or in any parking area, as
defined in section 14-219a for ten or more cars or upon any school property
while under the private road on which a speed limit has been established in
accordance the provisions of section 14-281 a or upon any school property while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both,
(e) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be fined not less
than three hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned
not more than six months or be both fined and imprisoned for the first offense,
and shall be imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year for the
second offense, and for any subsequent offense, shall be imprisoned not less
than six months nor more than one year; provided two days of the sentence
imposed for a second or subsequent offense may not be suspended or reduced
in any manner, and provided further such two-day minimum mandatory sen
tence may be served on a weekend.
See infra notes 106-118 and accompanying text for a discussion on Connecticut's new
drunk driving statute.
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-222 (1983) reads in part:
(a) No person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway of this
state or any road of any district organized under the provisions of chapter 105,
. . . any specially chartered municipal association of any or in any parking area
for ten cars or or more or upon any private road on which speed limit has been
established in accordance the provisions of section l4-2l8a or upon any school
property recklessly, having regard to the width, traffic and use of such highway,
road, school property or parking area, the intersection of streets and the
weather conditions. The operation of a motor vehicle upon any such highway,
road or parking area for ten cars or more at such a rate of speed as to endanger
the life of any person other than the operator of such motor vehicle, . . . shall
constitute a violation of the provisions of this section.
(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined not less
than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than thirty days or be both
fined and imprisoned for the first offense and for each subsequent offense shall
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favorable to the plaintiff and presuming the driver was drunk,16
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Con
necticut Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the officer did
not owe a specific duty to the plaintiffs decedent to enforce the mo
tor vehicle laws.J7 Public policy considerations weigh against the va
lidity of the public duty in dealing with drunk drivers.

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Public Duty/Private Duty Distinction

The public duty rule requires considering whether the duty im
posed upon an officer is a duty to the public. A failure to perform
that duty or an inadequate or erroneous performance subjects the
officer only to a public prosecution. If the duty is to the individual,
then neglecting to perform it gives rise to an individual cause of ac
tion. ls To say there is no duty is merely to start with a conclusion
rather than to analyze whether there should be a duty.19
The court in Shore stated that the distinction between a public
and private duty is an expression of many policy considerations
which leads the court to determine whether an interest of a particu
lar type is entitled to protection. 20 The court, however, failed to dis
cuss the policies that should have been considered in determining
whether to establish a duty.
The California Supreme Court in Reenderes v. City of Ontario, 21
outlined the policy considerations which a court should consider.
These considerations include:
[t]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree ot certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the
be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one
year or be both fined and imprisoned.
Id.
16. Shore, 187 Conn. at 150-51,444 A.2d at 1381. Several statements by witnesses
who saw Cugini in the V.F.W. indicated he was quite intoxicated. Brief of Plaintiff at la
4a, Shore.
17. Shore, 187 Conn. at 149-50,444 A.2d at 1380.
18. Id. at 152, 444 A.2d at 1381-82; Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 589-90, 116
A.2d 429, 432 (1955); 2 I. COOLEY, TORTS § 300 (4th ed. 1932).
19. Cracraft v. City ofSt. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 808 (Minn. 1979) (Kelly, J.,
dissenting); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 585, 240 N.E.2d 860, 862, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897, 901 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting).
20. Shore, 187 Conn. at 152,444 A.2d at 1382 (citing Reenders v. City of Ontario,
68 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 137 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1977».
21. 68 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 137 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1977).
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moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant
and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exer
cise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability,
cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 22

Although it cited Reenders, the Shore court failed to apply these cri
teria and merely drew the conclusion that the duty owed to the in
jured plaintiff was no different than that owed to the public in
general. 23
Had the court in Shore applied these criteria, it would have
reached a different result. First, if the driver was intoxicated and
Lieutenant Sylvia knew or should have known he was intoxicated, it
was foreseeable that injury could result to the plaintiffs decedent. 24
Second, it is clear the plaintiffs decedent suffered an injury. Third,
the question of the nexus between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered could simply be answered by asking the question
whether the accident would have occurred had Sylvia removed the
driver from the road, on the basis of intoxication. The answer is
obviously no. The fourth inquiry is the moral blame to be attached
to the defendant's conduct. Arguably, some moral blame 25 should
be attached when a police officer stops a drunk driver and takes no
action to remove him from the road or fails to determine his sobri
ety, and this failure subsequently results in the death of another
driver. The fifth consideration, preventing future harm, is very per
22. Id. at 1052-53; 137 Cal. Rptr. at 741-42 (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.
2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968».
23. Shore, 187 Conn. at 150, 444 A.2d at 1380. For a discussion of the policy
considerations for imposing a duty see infra notes 71-105 and accompanying text.
24. Under Connecticut law duty does not require foreseeing the probability of
harm or particular injury but rather a duty exists if an ordinary man in the defendant's
position, knowing what he knew or should have known, would have anticipated that
harm of the general nature of that suffered, was likely to result. Conn. Sav. Bank v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 138 Conn. 298, 303-04, 84 A.2d 267, 269-70 (1951).
25. Black's Law Dictionary defines moral as:
Pertains to character, conduct, intention, social relations, etc.
I. Pertaining or relating to the conscience or moral sense or to the general
principles of right conduct.
2. Cognizable or enforceable only by the conscience or by tl}e princip!es
of right conduct, as distinguished from positive law.
•
3. Depending upon or resulting from probability; raising a belief or, con
.
viction in the mind independent of strict or logical proof.
4. Involving or affecting the moral sense, as in the phrase 'moral
insanity.'
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 909 (5th ed. 1979).
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suasive, especially in the area of drunk driving.26 This concern has
been evidenced by an increasing trend to deal with the drunk driving
problem through stricter legislation.27 The sixth consideration is the
burden on the defendant and consequences to the community by im
posing a duty to exercise reasonable care. Although this issue will be
discussed later,28 it suffices to say that a wrong should not go effec
tively unredressed due to the concern over limitless liability because
there are available traditional negligence limitations. The seventh
and final consideration set forth in Reenders is the availability, cost,
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. The cost or avail
ability of insurance, however, may not justify imposing the burden
on the individual plaintiff rather than imposing the burden on the
municipality, which may better be able to bear the loss and spread
the risk over society for the failings of its police department. 29
The public duty rule has given rise to the successful argument
that because a duty is owed to everyone it is, therefore, owed to no
one. 3D This argument has been characterized as artificial; that is, any
duty to the public is a duty owed to an individual member of the
public. 3l Despite the artificial nature of this rule and ironic result,
the weight of authority remains in favor or retaining the rule in deal
ing with drunk drivers 32 and in other areas of police action. 33
26. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
27. See infra notes 106-118 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
30. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 585, 240 N.E.2d 860, 862, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897, 901 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting).
31. Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 540, 247 N.W.2d 132, 139 (1976).
32. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Pierce, 178 Cal. App. 2d 112, 2 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1960)
(police investigated previous accident in which drunk driver was involved but released
him after determining he was not intoxicated); Rubinow v. County of San Bernadino,
169 Cal. App. 2d 67,336 P.2d 968 (1959) (intoxicated driver was observed and followed
by deputy sheriff but was not stopped); Evett v. City of Inverness, 224 So. 2d 365 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (short time prior to accident police stopped intoxicated driver for
speeding). Contra Green v. City of Livermore, 117 Cal. App. 3d 82, 172 Cal. Rptr. 461
(1981) (state immunity statutes do not protect police from liability for stopping a car with
several intoxicated people, taking the driver into custody, and leaving the keys in the car
with intoxicated passengers).
The Arizona Supreme Court recently abolished the public duty rule holding that a
governmental body is subject to the same liability as a private citizen except when gov
ernmental immunity is necessary to avoid a severe "hampering of a governmental func
tion or thwarting of established public policy." Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, -,656 P.2d
597, 600 (1982).
A Massachusetts jury recently awarded a widow $873,697 in damages against a mu
nicipality for the failure of a police officer to arrest a drunk driver after stopping him.
The accident resulted in the death of the widow's husband and daughter and injuries to
her self and her son. Defense motions to dismiss, for summary judgment, interlocutory
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The court in Shore addressed situations in which liability may
be imposed on a municipality. The first situation occurs when a stat
ute or other rule of law imposes upon an official a duty that is clearly
ministerial rather than discretionary.34 The defendant claimed, as
an alternate ground for appeal, that the police officer's duty was dis
cretionary and therefore immune from liability.35 This issue, how
ever, was never addressed by the court because the finding of a
public duty was dispositive of the case. 36
The court in Shore recognized other situations in which liability
appeal, and directed verdict, failed. Irwin v. Town of Ware, No. 17562, (Mass., Ham
shire Super Ct., Feb. 11,1983). See II MASS. LAWYER'S WEEKLY 776 (1983). The case is
now on appeal.
33. See, e.g., Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 500 P.2d 1059 (1973) (fire
department permitted use of open flame heater in body shop contrary to fire prevention
code); Trautman v. City of Stamford, 32 Conn. Supp. 258, 350 A.2d 782 (1975) (plaintiff
injured by an automobile involved in drag race which police officer observed and al
lowed to go on in his presence); Leger v. Kelley, 19 Conn. Supp. 167, 110 A.2d 635 (1955)
(allowing plaintiffs car to be registered although not equipped with approved safety
glass); Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d I (D.C. 1981) (cursory investigation by
police of report of burglary at boarding house resulting in the robbery and rape of sev
eral females); Florida First Nat'l Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (repeated cursory investigation by police of reports of child beatings); Doe
v. Hendricks, 92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (1979) (delay in police responding to call result
ing in a young boy being sexually assaulted by an adult male); Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 700
(1972). See generally CAL. Goy'T CODE §§ 846, 818.2, 821 (Deering 1982) (granting im
munity for failure to make arrest, enforce any law, or enforce any enactment).
For a discussion against imposition of liability on a private entity who employs off
duty police who confront a drunk driver see Sports, Inc. v. Gilbert, - Ind. App. -, 431
N.E.2d 534 (1982).
34. Shore, 187 Conn. at 153,444 A.2d at 1382 (citing as examples: South v. Mary
land, 59 u.S. (18 How.) 396, 402-03 (1855) (civil action for refusal to recognize a validly
cast vote); Wright v. Brown, 167 Conn. 464, 471-72, 356 A.2d 176, 180-81 (1975) (releas
ing a dangerous dog from quarantine before expiration of the time period required». A
discretionary duty is one "requiring personal deliberation, decision, and judgment" and
a ministerial duty "amount[s) only to an obedience to orders, or the performance of a
duty in which the officer is left no choice of his own." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 132, at 988-89 (4th ed. 1971). Courts have had difficulty differentiating
between discretionary and ministerial acts. Wangerin, Actions and Remedies Against
Government Units and Public Officers for Nonfeasance, II Loy. U. L.J. 101, 110 (1979);
W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 132, at 988-90; see, e.g., Green v. City of Livermore, 117
Cal. App. 3d 82, 87-88, 172 Cal. Rptr. 461, 463 (1981).
35. Brief of Defendant Town of Stonington at 22-27, Shore.
36. Shore, 187 Conn. at 153-54, 444 A.2d at 1382. The Connecticut Supreme
Court has yet to address the issue of whether CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-465 (1983) imposes
liability for discretionary as well as ministerial acts. A lower court in Lapierre v. Town
of Bristol, 31 Conn. Supp. 442, 446, 333 A.2d 710, 712 (1974), reviewed the statute's
legislative history and concluded that the purpose of the statute was to impose liability
for discretionary as well as ministerial acts. The Connecticut Supreme Court avoided the
issue by finding that the duty in the case was ministerial. Fraser v. Henninger, 173 Conn.
52, 60 n.3, 376 A.2d 406, 411 n.3 (1977).
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could be imposed on a municipality. Specifically, the court stated
that municipalities may be liable when: I) a failure to act would
subject an identifiable person to imminent ~arm;37 2) a statute spe
cifically imposes liability for a failure to enforce it;38 3) the munici
pality engages in an action involving malice, wantonness, or an
intent to injure;39 4) the municipality assumes the function of a pri
vate corporation;40 5) a police request for aid to apprehend criminals
gives rise to a reciprocal duty to protect each person who aids them
from foreseeable harm;41 and 6) the municipality acts negligently in
hiring an unfit police officer.42

B.

Case Law Inconsistency

The court's holding in Shore is inconsistent with its holding
three years earlier in Sestito v. City of Groton .43 Sestito involved an
action brought by the estate of the decedent against the municipality
and the individual police officer to recover damages for the dece
dent's death during a public disturbance, which the police officer ob
served and did not attempt to stop. The court held the defendant
municipality could be liable alternatively under44 Connecticut Gen
eral Statutes §§ 7-108 45 and 7-465. 46 With regard to § 7-465 the
37. Shore, 187 Conn. at 153,444 A.2d at 1382 (citing Sestito v. City of Groton, 178
Conn 520, 528,423 A.2d 165, 170-71 (1979». See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying
text.
38. Shore, 187 Conn. at 154,444 A.2d at 1382 (citing Sestito v. City of Groton, 178
Conn. 520, 523-24, 423 A.2d 165, 169 (1979); and CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-108 (1983».
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-108 (1983) reads in part:
Each city and borough shall be liable for all injuries to person or property,
including injuries causing death, when such injuries are caused by an act of
violence of any person or persons while a member of, or acting in concert with,
any mob, riotous assembly or assembly of persons engaged in disturbing the
public peace, if such city or borough, or the police or other proper authorities
thereof, have not exercised reasonable care or diligence in the prevention or
suppression of such mob, riotous assembly or assembly engaged in disturbing
the public peace.
Id.
39. Shore, 187 Conn. at 155,444 A.2d at 1383. See, e.g., Stiebitz v. Mahoney, 144
Conn 443, 448-49, 134 A.2d 71, 74 (1957).
40. Shore, 187 Conn. at 155,444 A.2d at 1383 (citing Veach v. Phoenix, 102 Ariz.
195, 197,427 P.2d 335, 336-37 (1967».
41. Id. (citing Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 80-81,154 N.E.2d 534,
537, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1958».
42. Id. (citing Stiebitz v. Mahoney, 144 Conn. 443, 447, 134 A.2d 71, 73 (1957».
43. 178 Conn. 520, 423 A.2d 165 (1979). The dissent in Shore argued that Sestito
should control. 187 Conn. at 157,444 A.2d at 1384 (Peters, A.I. dissenting).
44. Sestito, 178 Conn. at 523-24, 423 A.2d at 169.
45. See supra note 38.
46. See supra note 12.
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court stated:
The question in each case is whether the facts present a situation
where the statute applies, this is, whether a public official's con
stant general duty to the public has, in addition, subsumed a spe
cific duty to the individual claiming injury. . . . It is this factual
inquiry that should be left for jury determination, whether the al
leged duty of the individual arises from other sta~utes, regulations,
or the common law.
Even as a matter of common law negligence, it is conceivable
that [the police officer] had a duty to the decedent to act as a
skilled policeman under the circumstances, and breached this
duty.47

In the Shore dissent, Associate Justice Peters argued that Sestito
stood for the proposition that liability could be imposed "under suffi
ciently provocative circumstances, without any prior contact."48 She
also argued that Sestito did not require an identifiable victim be
cause the disturbance in Sestito involved at least seven individuals
and there was no way of knowing who would be the victim.49
Because Shore, like Sestito, involved an action brought under
§ 7-465, the court's denial of liability in Shore is inconsistent with its
holding of liability in Sestito. This switch from holding that section
7-465 requires a "factual inquiry" to the conclusion that, as a matter
of law, a police officer's duty to enforce a statute is owed to the pub
lic in general illustrates why the rule is criticized as being artificial. 50
There is no sound basis for holding, in one case, that the determina
tion of whether a police officer's actions have caused him to subsume
a specific duty to an individual or whether he acted as a reasonable
police officer is a factual inquiry and holding, in a later case, that the
police officer's only duty is to the general public.
The arbitrariness of the public duty rule is further evidenced by
examining its relationship to traditional tort law.
C.

Traditional Tort Law

The public duty rule, in order to avoid a floodgate of litigation,
makes it more difficult to hold a municipality liable than it would be
if a duty under ordinary tort law were imposed. For this reason, it
47. Sestito, 178 Conn. at 528, 423 A.2d at 171.
48. Shore, 187 Conn. at 159,444 A.2d at 1384 (Peters, A.J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
49. Id. at 159, 444 A.2d at 1385 (Peters, A.J., dissenting).
50. See Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 540, 247 N.W.2d 132, 139
(1976).
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had been criticized as being a form of public immunity.51
Under Connecticut law, recovery for negligence requires proof,
by preponderance of the evidence, 52 that the defendant owed a duty
to the victim, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the
proximate cause of the harm suffered. 53 The test of duty is based on
the foreseeability that some harm may result. It does not require
foreseeing the probability of harm or the particular injury that re
sulted. Rather, the question is whether the ordinary man in the de
fendant's position, knowing what he knew or should have known,
anticipated harm of the general nature of that likely to result. 54
If this test was applied to a police officer, the issue would be
whether an officer, knowing what he knew or reasonably should
have known, would have anticipated the harm of the general nature
of that likely to result. Given the severity of the drunk driving prob
lem,55 and the probability of a drunk driver being involved in an
accident is between 8 to 1 and 250 to 1,56 it would seem foreseeable,
if Lieutenant Sylvia knew Cugini was intoxicated, that Cugini would
be involved in an accident and a third party would be injured. The
courts, however, usually fail to consider the application of tradi
tional negligence principles and merely hold that the duty is a public
duty and refuse to impose liability upon the municipality. 57 This
further supports the contention that the public duty rule is actually a
guise for public immunity. 58
Some courts have been willing to impose liability on a munici
pality for injury to a third person under a theory of negligent per
formance of an undertaking as outlined in the Restatement of
51. E.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976); Cracraft v. City ofSt.
Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 808-10 (Minn. 1979) (Kelly, J., dissenting); Riss v. City of
New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579,592,240 N.E.2d 860, 866, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 906 (1968) (Keat
ing, J., dissenting).
52. Preponderance of the evidence is "[e) vidence which is of greater weight or
more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence
which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1064 (5th ed. 1979).
53. Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186 Conn. 370, 372, 441 A.2d 620, 622 (1982).
54. Connecticut Sav. Bank v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 138 Conn. 298, 304, 84
A.2d 267, 269-70 (1951).
55. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
56. ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER, supra note 2, at 58.
57. Bul see Harryman v. Hayles, 257 N.W.2d 631,638 (Iowa 1977), where the
Supreme Court of Iowa held the abrogation of sovereign immunity imposes upon munic
ipal officers and employees the same liability as other tort defendants unless modified by
statute.
58. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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Torts. 59 This theory deals with a person who undertakes to render a
service to protect another from physical harm but because of his fail
ure to exercise reasonable care and because of the person's reliance
on this protection, injury results. At least one court has specifically
applied § 324A against a municipality,60 while others have applied a
similar theory.61
The court in Shore rejected this argument, finding that the offi
cial already owes a duty to the public. 62 As one court has stated,
however, simply because a duty is of a public nature does not mean
a municipality cannot be found liable for breach of that duty.63
Even the court in Sestito seemed to be indirectly applying this con
cept by finding that, as a matter of common law, a police officer may
be required to act as a reasonably skilled policeman under the
circumstances. 64
Although it may be unclear and perhaps impossible to deter
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965):
One who undertakes, gratutiously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking,
if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm,
or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third
person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third per
son upon the undertaking.

Id.
60. Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 540, 247 N.W.2d 132, 139 (1976);
accord Cracraft v. City ofSt. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 809 (Minn. 1979) (Kelly, J.,
dissenting).
61. E.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 240 (Alaska 1976); Veach v. City of Phoe
nix, 102 Ariz. 195, 197,427 P.2d 335, 337 (1967); Green v. City of Livermore, 117 Cal.
App. 3d 82, 88, 172 Cal. Rptr. 461, 463-64 (1981); Stone v. State, \06 Cal. App. 3d 924,
929-30, 165 Cal. Rptr. 339, 342 (1980); Florida First Nat'l Bank v. City of Jacksonville,
3 \0 So. 2d 19,26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75,
80-81,154 N.E.2d 534, 537,180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1958). Bur see Hartzler v. City of San
Jose, 46 Cal. App. 3d 6, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1975) (20 previous calls does not establish
special relationship); McCarthy v. Frost, 33 Cal. App. 3d 872, \09 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973)
(no special relationship or justifiable reliance requiring patrolmen to discover accident);
Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d I (D.C. 1981) (cursory investigation by police
in responding to call resulting in a young boy being sexually assaulted by an adult male);
Sports, Inc. v. Gilbert, - Ind. App. -, 431 N.E.2d 534 (1982) (off-duty police officer
employed by a private entity who confronted an intoxicated driver did not increase the
risk of harm nor establish justifiable reliance by plaintiff).
62. 187 Conn. at 157, 444 A.2d at 1384.
63. Stewart v. Schmeider, 386 So. 2d 1351, 1358 (La. 1980).
64. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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mine when a duty is actually undertaken, how far it extends, and
what conduct is required,65 an inquiry should be made to determine
if a duty is in fact undertaken. Because of the difficulty in determin
ing when a duty is undertaken it has been suggested that the concept
of duty will
[c]ontinue to expand until it approaches a general holding that the
mere knowledge of serious peril, threatening death or great bodily
harm to another, which an identified defendant might avoid with
little inconvenience, creates a sufficient relation, recognized by
every moral and social standard to impose a duty of action. When
a duty is recognized, it is agreed that it calls for nothing more than
reasonable care under the circumstances. 66

Furthermore, it has been argued that all that may be needed under
all circumstances is the exercise of reasonable care. 67 The law gener
ally, absent a special relationship, will not impose a duty upon a
person to control the conduct of a third person to prevent them from
causing harm to another. 68 It has been recognized, however, that a
government can, by its conduct, narrow an obligation owing to the
public into a duty to an individual,69 but the examples of such an
obligation are few and far between. 7o Such may be the case in
Shore, where a police officer had undertaken to investigate a drunk
driver, which he may have reasonably expected to be intoxicated,
and failed to exercise reasonable care to protect those people using
the highways by removing the suspected drunk driver.
65. W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 56, at 344.
66. Id. at 343.
67. Id. at 348.
68. See supra note 61. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315
(1965):
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to
the other a right to protection.
For a discussion of the evolution of the public duty rule in Arizona, see Cody v. State,
129 Ariz. 258, 630 P.2d 554 (1981).
69. Eg., Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 523, 456 P.2d 376, 381 (1969)
(Arizona subsequently abolished the public duty rule. See supra note 32); Trautman v.
City of Stamford, 32 Conn. Supp. 258, 262-63, 350 A.2d 782, 784 (1975).
70. Eg., Veach v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195,427 P.2d 335 (1967); Schuster v.
City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
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D. Policy Considerations
The notion of duty has been characterized as being artificial be
cause a court may find liability simply by finding the necessary rela
tionship between the parties to give rise to a duty.71 To say there is
no duty begs the question of whether some interest of the plaintiff is
entitled to protection. 72 "[I]t should be recognized that 'duty' is not
sacrosanct itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead to law to say that the particular
plaintiff is entitled to protection."73
The court should engage in an analysis of these policy consider
ations to determine if the plaintiff has an interest entitled to protec
tion rather than arbitrarily drawing the conclusion that there is no
duty.
One of the policy concerns most often expressed in establishing
a duty is the fear of limitless liability upon a municipality.74 This,
too, was the concern when sovereign immunity was abolished, but it
has never come true. 75 The cost should not be of any "importance as
compared to the injustice of permitting unredressed wrongs to con
tinue to go unrepaired."76 To deny the victim a remedy against a
police officer who is derelict in his duty is to deny him effective relief
from the wrong he has suffered. The claim of limitless liability is a
fallacy because of the limits that are imposed by traditional tort prin
ciples. 77 All that would be required of the defendant is the exercise
of reasonable care under the circumstances,78 subject also to the re
71. W. PROSSER, supra note 32, § 53, at 325.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 325-26 (footnotes omitted).
74. E.g., Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 523, 456 P.2d 376, 381 (1969)
(Arizona subsequently abolished the public duty rule. See supra note 32); Cracraft v.
City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 808 (Minn. 1979).
75. See Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Minn. 1979)
(Kelly, J., dissenting); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 585-86, 240 N.E.2d 860,
863, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 901 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting).
76. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 585-86, 240 N.E.2d 860, 863, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897, 901 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting).
77. Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Minn. 1979) (Kelly, J.,
dissenting); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 586, 240 N.E.2d 860, 863, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897, 902 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting); Note, MuniCipal Tort Liabilityfor Fail
ure to Provide Adequate Police Protection in New York State, 39 ALB. L. REV. 599, 613
(1975).
78. Cracraft v. City ofSt. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Minn. 1981) (Kelly, J.,
dissenting); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 586, 240 N.E.2d 860, 863, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897,902 (1968).
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quirements of proximate cause and foreseeability.79 Imposing liabil
ity also puts the government on notice that the municipality is not
functioning properly,80 and imposes a choice of either improving
public administration or accepting the cost of compensating the in
jured party.81 It also seems that when the Connecticut General As
sembly enacted section 7-465, which imposes liability for damage
caused by municipal employees and abolishes governmental immu
nity as a defense-they weighed and considered the financial burden
that might result and found it not to be overwhelming. 82
Another important reason for imposing liability upon a munici
pality is the interest in spreading the risk throughout society. Again,
assumption of liability under section 7-465 may represent a con
scious policy of risk-spreading, implying that society rather than the
individual must bear the loss for its failings. 83 It is society that bene
fits from police protection, but the public duty rule forces the indi
vidual to bear the cost when that police protection fails. 84
[Tort losses often] fall initially on people who as a class can ill
afford them, and this fact brings great hardship upon the victims
themselves and causes unfortunate repercussions to society as a
whole. The best and most efficient way to deal with accident loss,
therefore, is to assure accident victims of substantial compensa
tion, and to distribute the losses involved over society as a whole
or some very large segment of it. 85

Society does benefit froJIl the distribution of 10sses. 86
The policy of risk-spreading cannot be ignored, especially in the
79. Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Minn. 198t) (Kelly, J.,
dissenting).
80. Wangerin, supra note 34, at 105.
8!. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 589, 240 N.E.2d 860, 863, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897, 905 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting).
82. Accord Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 674 (Iowa 1979). See IOWA CODE
ANN. § 613A.2 (West 1950 & Supp. 1982), which is similar to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-465
(1983). See infra note 109.
83. Accord Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 244 (Alaska 1976). CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 7 -108 (1981) imposes liability on a municipality for damages caused by riotous assem
blies upon a finding that the municipality failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the
mob activity. The purpose is to spread the cost of riots over society. See Comment, Rio/
Insurance, 77 YALE L.J. 541, 552 (1968).
84. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 590, 240 N.E.2d 860, 865, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897, 905 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 77, at 60!.
85. 2 E. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 13.2, at 762-63 (1956).
86. Id. at 763. Society benefits from the distribution of losses in two ways: First
persons engaged in the activity which causes the loss will have a "certain, calcuable, and
reasonable cost" rather than ruinous loss; and second, the victim is protected from the
risk of financial ruin or shock. Society benefits because "social good includes the sum of
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situation which occurred in Shore. Lieutenant Sylvia failed in his
duty; whether this was reasonable or not should have been left to a
jury to decide. Sylvia was in a position to prevent the loss but failed
to do so. The court's decision unilaterally places the financial bur
den on the victim's family without allowing a jury to consider the
reasonableness of the officer's actions or the question of causation. If
the court abolishes the archaic public duty rule in the interest of risk
spreading, the jury would be allowed to decide if the municipality's
actions warrant spreading the cost.
Connecticut currently has an administrative procedure for com
pensating persons who are subjected to crime. 87 The statute provides
compensation for personal injury or death resulting from an attempt
to prevent a crime or to aid the police in preventing a crime or ap
prehending a criminal. The statute also provides compensation for
personal injury or death resulting from the commission or attempt to
commit a crime, except for injuries resulting from the operation of a
motor vehicle, unless the injury was intentional. 88 This statute seems
to recognize a greater benefit will result from spreading the risk
throughout society instead of making the victim bear the cost.
The reluctance to compensate victims of motor vehicle accidents
is due in part to the enormous number of motor vehicle accidents
that occur each year. The situation in Shore, however, is signifi
cantly different from an ordinary motor vehicle accident. First, had
it occurred under the present statute, the drunk driver would have
been guilty of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehi
cle,89 rather than the lesser offense of misconduct with a motor vehi
cle. 90 Second, the police officer undertook a duty of investigating a
possible drunk driver and should have been held to a standard of
reasonable care in performing that investigation. This is distinguish
able from an ordinary automobile accident in which a police officer
is unable to anticipate whether a particular driver might be involved
the good accruing to individuals." Additionally, society avoids the "repercussions of
individual ruin." Id. at 763 n.7.
87. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-209 (1983).
88. Id. A victim can be compensated for all actual and reasonable expenses in
cluding loss of earning capacity, pecuniary loss to d.ependents, and any other loss. Id.
§ 54-210. There is a minimum requirement of one hundred dollars and a maximum of
ten thousand dollars. Id. § 54-211(c). The fund is financed by court costs charged to
those convicted of a crime. Id. § 54-215.
89. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-56b (1983). Manslaughter in the second degree with
a motor vehicle is a class C felony carrying with it a sentence of not less than one year
nor more than ten and/or a fine up to $5000. Id.
90. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-57 (1981). Misconduct with a motor vehicle is a class
D felony carrying with it a sentence of one to five years. Id.
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in an accident. Additionally, the drunk driver situation involves
more of a wrong to society rather than a wrong to the immediate
parties involved.
The crime victim compensation act also appears to be a recogni
tion that financial disaster to a governmental unit will not result if
they compensate victims of crime. Possibly, the answer lies in the
legislature expanding the scope of the crime victim compensation
statute to include victims of drunk drivers. 91 The exclusion of vic
tims of motor vehicle accidents, however, should not prevent impos
ing liability when a police officer fails to act reasonably in an
investigation of a possible drunk driver.
Procedures that compensate crime victims inevitably weaken
the validity of the public duty distinction. Because the legislature,
evidently, did not find the policy arguments supporting the distinc
tion between a public duty and an individual duty to be prohibitive
in compensating victims. Similarly, these policy concerns should not
prevent the courts from imposing liability upon municipality when
one of its servants fails to act reasonably in performing his duty.
A highly persuasive theory for imposing liability is based upon
the idea of power monopoly and dependency.92 The argument has
best been stated as:
[T]he policeman [may use] the power of his office as well as the
physical energy available to him to prevent injuries to members of
the community, who because of lack of knowledge of the hazard
were completely dependent on the imposition of restraints by one
with public authority. In these situations the officer is the only
one who could have effectively prevent harm that was probable to
even a casual observer. The very fact that it is police power that is
involved would seem to accentuate the duty to individuals rather
than to detract from it. It is inherent in the idea of a police force
that it is to take measures of defense that private citizens ordina
rily are not able to effect themselves. . . . In defining the sphere
of obligation, the legal system whould take full account of this
effective monopoly of power.93
91. A bill was submitted to the 1983 Connecticut General Assembly to expand the
crime victim compensation statute to compensate persons who were injured or killed as a
result of drunk drivers. This program and alcohol and drug abuse programs would have
been funded by imposing a special surcharge on liquor sold for on-premises consump
tion. Hansen, On the Court House Steps, Conn. L. Tribune, Jan. 24, 1983, at I, col. 1. To
date, the bill has not been enacted.
92. M. SHAPO, THE DuTY TO ACT 106-07 (1977).
93. Id. at 106-07. Accord Wanergin, supra note 32, at 105, 139; Note, supra note
77, at 612.
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This theory could be applied appropriately when a police officer
stops a drunk driver. The public assumes that when a police officer
stops someone he suspects of operating while under the influence,94
he will take the appropriate steps to verify whether the driver is in
toxicated and, if so, to prevent him from continuing on the road. 95
There is a strong societal reliance that the police officer will exercise
his power to the fullest extent to protect the public. Although the
officer's actions do not create reliance by an identifiable individual,
there is a reliance by every individual using the road that a police
officer will use his power to deal with a suspected drunk driver. The
officer, at the moment he suspects a driver to be intoxicated, has su
perior knowledge and a monopoly of power to deal with that person.
If he fails to reasonably exercise this power and injury results, then
liability should be imposed on the municipality.
Another issue of concern expressed by the majority in Shore
was the fear that the police would be subject to actions for false
arrest if an officer overcompensated to avoid liability by attempting
to remove everyone from the road. 96 Connecticut recently enacted a
new stricter drunk driving statute97 which provides an officer with
probable cause to arrest a person suspected of operating a motor ve
hicle while under the influence if he was driving erratically, violated
a motor vehicle statute, or was involved in an accident. 98 As a result,
any arrest or detention authorized by this statute cannot be an un
lawful arrest. Therefore, the court's concern regarding unlawful
arrest now appears unwarranted because of this relatively lax re
quirement for probable cause to require a person to submit to a
blood, breath, or urine analysis. This reflects a strong legislative
mandate favoring strict enforcement of the drunk driving statute.
Another concern expressed by the court in Shore was that im
94. Whether a police officer does in fact suspect or should suspect a driver of oper
ating while under the influence would be a question of fact for the trier of fact.
95. Connecticut's new drunk driving statute authorizes police to immediately sus
pend a drunk driver's license. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227a(h) (1983).
96. 187 Conn. at 157, 444 A.2d at 1384. False imprisonment or arrest is "the un
lawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another" regardless of how brief.
Green v. Donroe, 186 Conn. 265, 267, 440 A.2d 973, 974 (1982).
97. See infra notes 106-118 and accompanying text.
98. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227b(c) (1983). Probable cause is defined as "the
knowledge of facts sufficient to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has reason
able grounds for prosecuting. . . ." McGann v. Alien, 105 Conn. 177, 186, 134 A. 810,
813 (1926).
Connecticut statutes also authorize a police officer to arrest any person for any of
fense committed in their jurisdiction when apprehended in the act or on speedy informa
tion. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-If (1983).

1076

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:1059

posing a duty would hamper the exercise of official discretion. 99 The
dissent argued that a failure to take reasonable precautions in con
spiciously hazardous circumstances would not unreasonably cramp
the exercise of discretion. Further, the dissent maintained that it is
more unusual to impose liability for failing to intervene in a drunken
brawl at the officers own peril, as in Sestito, than to impose liability
for interposing and preventing a fatal injury by a drunk driver. loo
Any interference with an official's discretion may be insufficient to
make the victim bear the COSt. 101 Imposing liability may inevitably
have the effect of forcing the municipality to be more prudent in its
law enforcement duty or accept the cost of compensating victims of
the neglect of duty. 102 The severity and economic cost of drunk driv
ing,103 both in terms of dollars and lives, makes highly persuasive the
argument that municipalities should be pressured into clamping
99. 187 Conn. at 157, 444 A.2d at 1384 (Peters, A.J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 162, 444 A.2d at 1386 (Peters, A.J., dissenting).
101. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235,244 (Alaska 1976).
102. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
The California Highway Patrol has listed the following 14 deviations from nor
mal driving as an enforcement guide in a manual "The Drinking Driver."
1) Unreasonable speed (high)
2. Driving in spurts (slow, then fast, then slow).
3) Frequent lane changing with excessive speed.
4) Improper passing with insufficient clearance, also taking too long or
swerving too much in overtaking and passing; i.e. overcontrol.
5) Overshooting or disregarding traffic control signals.
6) Approaching signals unreasonably fast or slow, and stopping or at
tempting to stop with uneven motion.
7) Driving at night without lights. Delay in turning lights on when start
ing from a parked position.
8) Failure to dim lights to oncoming traffic.
9) Driving in lower gears without apparent reason, or repeatedly clashing
gears.
10) Jerky starting or stopping.
11) Driving unreasonably slow.
12) Driving too close to shoulders or curbs, or appearing to hug the edge
of the road or continually straddling the centerline.
13) Driving with widows down in cold weather.
14) Driving or riding with head partly or completely out the window.
ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER, supra note 2, at 135.
103. The annual economic cost arising of drunk driving accidents is between $17
and $24 billion. This includes expenses for "medical rehabilitation and insurance ex
penses, foregone work income and tax revenue, property damage, and expenses for po
lice and emergency services." 134 CONGo REC. S13197 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1982) (statement
of Sen. Danforth). "Added to this economic cost is the emotional cost to the hundreds of
thousands injured or disabled in drunk driving accidents, and to the friends and relatives
left behind by the accident victims. This cost is truly immeasurable." Id.
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down on the drunk driver. 104
Analogous to this concern is the concern that if liability is im
posed when a police officer acts unreasonably in stopping a sus
pected drunk driver, the officer may be deterred from stopping the
vehicle in the first place. The expense and time in investigating an
accident that may result may be greater than the time and inconven
ience in performing a blood-alcohol test, suspending a license, and
filing the necessary papers. Also, under the rule of law expounded
by the court in Shore, the duty to enforce the drunk driving and
reckless driving statutes are public duties and a failure to perform
them may be redressed in a public prosecution. lOS Imposing civil
liability under sufficiently provocative circumstances may not be any
more of a deterrent to investigating a drunk driver, than is subjecting
the officer to public prosecution or causing him to lose his job for not
enforcing the law. Therefore, the concern that imposing civilliabil
ity would act as a deterrent to law enforcement appears unfounded
and, given the societal interest in curbing the drunk driving problem,
liability should be imposed.
E.

New Drunk Driving Statute

The desire that drunk drivers be dealt with harshly and deci
sively is evidenced by Connecticut's new statutes dealing with driv
ing while intoxicated. I06 The statutes impose strict penalties for
causing the death l07 or serious bodily injurylO8 to another with a mo
tor vehicle while intoxicated. 109 The statutes also state that anyone
104. "Theoretically, by using 100 per cent intensity in applying ... countermea
sures, the desired goal, control of the alcohol manifestations, could be completely
achieved, thereby saving lives, preventing injuries, and protecting property in significant
amounts." ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER, supra note 2, at 128.
105. Shore, 187 Conn. at 152,444 A.2d at 1381.
106. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-227a, -227b, 53a-57b, -6Od (1983).
107. The statute makes this manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehi
cle while intoxicated, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-56b (1983), punishable by a prison term
of one to 10 years and/or a $5,000 fine. Id. §§ 53a-35(a)(5), 53a-41(2).
Formerly this was criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, punish
able by a prison term of one to five years and/or a $5,000 fine. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a
57 (1981).
108. The statute makes this second degree assault with a motor vehicle while intox
icated, CONN. GEN. STAT. 653a-60d (1983) punishable by a prison term of one to five
years and/or a $5,000 fine. Id. §§ 53a-35(a)(6), 53a-46(2).
109. Congress recently passed and the President signed into law a bill providing
incentive grants to states, on a declining basis, if they enact a drunk driving program that
meets the following minimum requirements: I) prompt license suspension on the basis of
blood-alcohol test or on the driver's refusal to submit to such a test; 2) mandatory
sentences for repeat offenders; 3) a finding of driving under the influence where the blood

-,
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operating a motor vehicle within the state gives implied consent to a
chemical analysis of his blood, urine, or breath. I to Refusal to submit
to a chemical analysis results in a suspension of license or nonresi
dent operating privileges for -ninety days for the first refusal, one
year for the second, and three years for any subsequent refusal. 111
Under another new statute, a person arrested for drunk driving
may also be ordered to submit to an alcohol education program. I 12
Anyone convicted of driving while intoxicated faces a mandatory
prison sentence, which cannot be suspended, of at least two days for
the first offense, if the blood-alcohol ratio exceeds .20 per cent, and
at least thirty days for any subsequent offense. I 13
The provision of the statute especially relevant to the issue is the
authority given to the police. After arresting someone as an offender
of the statute, performing a blood-alcohol test, and determining that
the blood-alcohol ratio exceeds .10 per cent, 114 the arresting officer is
immediately instructed to revoke the driver's license or driving privi
lege for twenty-four hours. I 15 If a person arrested under the statute
refuses to submit to a blood-alcohol analysis the officer is to immedi
ately revoke the drivers license for twenty-four hours. I 16
These statutes reflect a legislative mandate that the drunk driver
is to be dealt with immediately and harshly. The extraordinary re
quirement that an officer immediately revoke a license or driving
alcohol content is .10 percent and 4) increased enforcement efforts, coupled with public
information programs to publicize such efforts. Act of October 25, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97
364,97 Stat. 1738 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.c. § 402).
The bill would, however, assist and encourage States efforts against drunk driv
ing by offering significant financial incentives to States which are prepared to
enact a comprehensive attack on the problem. . . . The incentive grants pro
gram is directed at getting drunk drivers off the road and encouraging States to
adopt comprehensive alcohol traffic safety programs.
134 CONGo REC. S13197 (daily ed. October I, 1982) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
110. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227b (1983).
Ill. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-227b(d), -227b(f) (1983).
The United States Supreme Court has held the refusal to submit to a blood alcohol
test is admissible evidence and not a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self
incrimination even if the police officer fails to warn the defendant that the refusal could
be used against him at trial. South Dakota V. Nelville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 923 (1983).
112. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227a(f) (1983).
113. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227a(c) (1983). A person convicted of violating this
section faces a fine between $300 and $1000 or imprisonment up to six months for the
first offense, for a second offense faces imprisonment of sixty days to one year and for
any subsequent offense faces imprisonment of six months to one year. Id.
114. Nearly one-half of all drivers killed in traffic accidents had a blood-alcohol
content in excess of .10 per cent. 13 DEPT. OF TRANSP. ANN. REP. 32 (1979).
liS. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227a(h) (1983).
116. 1982 Conn. Acts 408(4)(c) (Reg. Sess.).

1984)

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY AND DRUNK DRIVERS

1079

privilege demonstrates a legislative desire that police should imme
diately remove a drunk driver from the roads because of the danger
he poses to himself and others.
Imposing liability will have the effect of forcing the police to
fulfill this legislative desire and remove this "ticking time bomb" 117
from the road when there is probable cause 11S to suspect that the
driver is intoxicated. In the future, should a case like Shore again
come before a Connecticut court, the court would best effectuate the
legislative policy regarding drunk drivers by imposing liability upon
a municipality if a police officer fails to act reasonably in investigat
ing that drunk driver.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The public duty/private duty distinction has truly become
archaic and artificial. It is inconsistent with the basic negligence
principles of duty and foreseeability and with recent Connecticut
case law stating that a public official's duty to the public is subsumed
by a duty to an individual claiming injury. Due to the severity of the
drunk driving problem, policy considerations also favor abolishing
this arbitrary distinction between public and private duty which
stands in the way of imposing liability upon municipalities. To ef
fectively deal with the drunk driving problem requires "increas[ing]
the risk of arrest, conviction, and punishment. Accordingly arrest
must be swift and sure." 1 19 Law enforcement personnel should use
the authority and power vested in them to properly deal with a sus
pected drunk driver in order to prevent the driver from endangering
those who may be using the roadways. The adoption of stricter
drunk driving laws and the recognition that, in some crimes the vic
tim should not bear the cost, provide impetus to abolish the public
duty rule and strong policy considerations to allow a jury to deter
mine whether a particular officer has acted reasonably in confronting
a drunk driver. Imposing liability when the officer had knowledge of
the suspected drunk driver and the power to deal with him may be a
step forward in preventing the deaths of the three people who are
killed and the eighty who are injured every hour of every day by a

117. Shore, 187 Conn. at 162,444 A.2d at 1386 (Peter, A.I., dissenting).
118. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
119. Hearings, supra note I, at 67.
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drunk driver. 120
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120. 134
Danforth).
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